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Abstract
How many members should committees consist of? This paper addresses this
question in view of imperfect information and coordination behavior among the
members, which is a new approach alternative to introducing information acquisi-
tion cost. First, using a simple model, I show that the existence of the coordination
motive dismisses Condorcet's (1785) suggestion and the ¯nite optimal size of the
committee is determined. Second, I provide an application of the mechanism to
monetary policy committees in a basic New Keynesian model. This example will
inspire other applications to policy issues in the dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium framework.
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1 Introduction
How many members should committees consist of? This paper addresses this question in
view of imperfect information and coordination behavior among the members, which is
a new approach alternative to introducing information acquisition cost. While enlarging
the committee promotes information aggregation e®ect, it also foments ine±cient coor-
dination behavior among the members by reducing the power of the individuals in the
whole of the committee. This ensures the existence of the optimal size of the committee.
The economic theory of committee decision-making has been developing rapidly in
recent years. The background of this stream is not only the progress of game theory
but also that decision-making by committee has played an important role in the actual
economic activities. Many countries traditionally adopt the jury systems and their design
problems have been one of the central subjects of the academic and practical arguments
in committee design. As the latest event, Japan brought the citizen judge system into
e®ect in 2009 and its design problem was and will be discussed hard. Another outstanding
example is the establishment of the monetary policy committees in many countries. Bank
of England and Bank of Japan founded the Monetary Policy Committee in 1997 and the
Policy Board in 1998 respectively and the central banks of the other countries one after
another. Besides, the governments of many countries traditionally call the well-informed
persons to the committees for the important policy issues such as tax reforms and the big
¯rms in general hold the meetings to make decisions on the important matters for their
business. Following this trend, the demand for the committee design is growing day by
day.
The problem of optimal committee size is one of the important issues in the area of
group decision-making. The most fundamental argument is whether or not we can enrich
the performance of the committees (unlimitedly) by increasing the number of the com-
mittee members (in¯nitely). A famous answer for it is Condorcet's (1785) jury theorem.
The theorem asserts that when the committee members vote honestly by use of their own
information, enlarging the committee always raises the probability that the committee
makes an appropriate decision and it converges to one as the committee size goes to
in¯nity. This implies that ¯nite optimal sizes of committees do not exist. The result is
intuitive in a sense but there exist several critical arguments against it in recent literature.
They dispute Condorcet's assertion, mainly focusing on that information acquisition of
the committee members is costly in the real world and this a®ects the members' behavior
as follows. 1 When the committee size is large, the committee members are apt to avoid
paying the information acquisition cost and free-ride on the information that the other
1Gerling et al. (2005) provides a brief survey on this topic.
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members provide because their contribution to the decision of the committee is small
relatively to the information acquisition cost. Thus, Condorcet jury theorem can fail to
hold under the existence of information acquisition cost.
In this paper, I take an approach di®erent from the existing studies to discuss on
the optimal committee size. I focus on the role of coordination behavior among the
committee members with noisy common information. This is motivated as follows. In
the case of the jury systems, although individual names of jurors are not disclosed, tri-
als by courts are held publicly and their sayings are documented and reported. When
the individual jurors face uncertainty, they may avoid distant voting from the general
tendency in the jury. Besides, many organizations have instituted the rules of informa-
tion disclosure in recent years. In particular, disclosure of public information on the
policy issues of the government and central bank has usually been a legal mandate in
many developed countries. How does such an institutional trend make a di®erence in
committee decision-making? Transparency may generate the incentive of the committee
members to coordinate with the other members because the minutes are often opened to
the public under transparency and hence the individual member faces an accountability
problem. That is, when the information on the decision-making process in the committee
is disclosed to the outsiders, the ine±ciency of each member's vote, which is revealed ex
post, is also known to them and it a®ects the individual valuation or reputation of each
member. Unless the common information of all the members is perfectly correct, the
coordination behavior can bring an ine±cient decision.
There is another reason for taking the approach other than information acquisition
cost. Although the assumption of the existence of information acquisition cost is intu-
itively plausible, it is questionable whether the assumption ¯ts with design of committees,
for example, the jury systems. Indeed, jurors usually question the accused in the courts
but they fundamentally rely on the material and circumstantial evidence provided by the
prosecutors and the defense. That is, in general, jurors do not get information drudgingly.
I think that this is one of the limits of introducing information acquisition cost in com-
mittee design. Also, the model with costly information does not ¯t for the committees
consisting of experts. This is because experts are generally well-informed about the issues
concerned in advance and detail information such as data is often provided not by the
committee members but the sta®. Typical examples are the monetary policy committees
and the other policy boards. In fact, Toshiro Muto, who is a deputy governor of Bank
of Japan, said that he did not sense the e®ect of the free-rider problem of information
provision in the meetings according to his experience as an insider of the Policy Board.2
2See Muto (2007).
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The setting of the present paper is an attempt to ¯nd an alternative framework which is
suitable to the case where the committee consists of experts.
The main ¯ndings of this paper are as follows. When the committee members have the
incentive to coordinate with the other members, enlarging the committee size foments the
coordination behavior. The reasoning is that each member realizes that her power to the
¯nal decision of the committee is reduced and has to bury herself so as not to stand out
in all the committee members. Thus, while a large committee can absorb idiosyncrasy
of noisy decentralized information strongly, it brings a large coordination loss. The
optimal size of the committee is the size which brings the best trade-o® between the
positive and negative e®ects above and it generally exists in a wide parameter region. The
optimal committee size decreases in the potential coordination motive and the precision
of common information since they increase the dependency of the committee members on
noisy common information. Thus, this paper provides a new explanation for the existence
and properties of the optimal committee size.
Another contribution of this paper to the literature is that the benchmark model has
an explicit application to a concrete economic problem. I extend the benchmark model to
a macroeconomic model for monetary policy analysis which starts from decision-making
by the monetary policy committee and investigate its optimal size. In the last decade,
many countries established the formal committee for decision-making on monetary policy.
So that, in recent arguments of monetary policy, the institutional design problems of
monetary policy committee are regarded as important matters and the optimal committee
size is one of them. 3 This paper is the ¯rst paper which analyzes the optimal size of the
monetary policy committee in a formal model of the modern framework for monetary
policy analysis. Since central bank transparency is also a remarkable feature of modern
monetary policy as mentioned above, this paper's approach is motivated along the trend
of central banking.
There is enormous literature on Condorcet jury theorem. Here, I brie°y review several
studies relevant to the present paper. It is known that Condorcet jury theorem does not
hold under some kinds of strategic voting since sincere voting, which is one of crucial
assumption for the theorem, is inconsistent with equilibrium. Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996) show that sincere voting is not attained in equilibrium when the individuals take
their being pivotal into consideration. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show that the
probability of false accusation can be increasing in the jury size under unanimity rule.
Several studies suggest that Condorcet jury theorem also fails to hold when information
acquisition of the individuals is costly. 4 Mukhopadhaya (2003) assumes the environment
3Blinder (2007) provides a brief survey on this issue.
4It is known that there is a case where the asymptotic e±ciency as in Condorcet jury theorem can
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where the individuals have identical preferences and their information acquisition is costly.
By a numerical method, he shows that welfare can be lower in mixed-strategy equilibria
of large committees than pure-strategy equilibria of small committees. Koriyama and
Szentes (2009) assume the environment similar to Mukhopadhaya (2003) and show that
the optimal committee size is bounded. They also show that the ine±ciency of oversized
committees is smaller than that of the undersized committees. Thus, the recent literature
mainly focuses on information acquisition cost. The framework of the present paper can
treat the cases of experts committees to which the existence of information acquisition
cost is not suitable.
There are a few studies on optimal size of monetary policy committees. Sibert (2006)
conjectures that the free-rider problem of information acquisition can play a role for the
discussion on the issue. 5 However, it seems disputable in the standpoint of practice of
decision-making in the monetary policy committees as Muto (2007) suggests. This paper
provides an alternative approach to study optimal size of monetary policy committees and
an intuitively plausible answer for the problem in a formal model in modern framework
for monetary policy analysis. Some empirical studies ¯nd the facts on monetary policy
committees. In particular, Berger and Nitsch (2008) ¯nd the fact that in°ation volatility
is U-shaped in the size of the monetary policy committees. This shows that the structure
of the monetary policy committees a®ects the economic outcome in actual. The result
of the present paper explains the fact above by showing the two e®ects of enlarging
the monetary policy committee: the positive e®ect of information aggregation and the
negative e®ect of coordination.
In the rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple microe-
conomic model which describes the substantial mechanism for the determination of the
optimal committee size. Section 3 applies the mechanism in Section 2 to a design of the
monetary policy committee in a modern macroeconomic model and provides some policy
implications. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 A Simple Model
This section provides a simple microeconomic model which describes the process of
decision-making and determination of the ¯nite optimal size of the committee. It is
very abstract but can grasp clearly the role of coordination behavior in decision-making
hold even if information acquisition is costly. Martinelli (2006) shows that if there is only variable cost
for obtaining precision of the signals, then the probability that the committee makes a correct decision
converges to one as the committee size goes to in¯nity.
5On the free-rider problem of information as a public good, for example, see Li (2001).
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by the committee.
2.1 Setup
I set up a benchmark model. The committee consists of N (ex-ante) homogeneous mem-
bers. It is seated to pursue a target µ 2 R on behalf of an organization in the background.
6 For example, juries are called to judge criminal suits reasonably in the cause of (social)
justice and monetary policy committees are organized to make an appropriate decision
on monetary policy for society's bene¯t. The target µ is interpreted as an underlying
state or the committee's optimal response to it. For instance, µ is the truth of the case in
the trials. 7 In the model of monetary policy by committee which I provide in the next
section, the counterpart of µ is a level of nominal interest rate set in optimal discretionary
policy under perfect information. 8
Each member of the committee has uninformative °at prior about µ over the real line
but receives common and private signals on µ. 9 The common signal is of the form such
as
y = µ + ´;
where the noise term ´ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ®¡1. Each
member knows that the realization of y and the distribution of ´ are common and known
to everyone. The common signal is interpreted as a content of a sta® report or well-
balanced recognition among the committee members especially as experts. The private
signal of an arbitrary member j is also of the standard form such as
xj = µ + "j;
where the noise term "j is mutually independent and normally distributed with mean
zero and variance ¯¡1. She knows that the distribution is common to every member
6I believe that this is a natural motivation for the establishements of the actual committees in many
cases according to concrete application (such as the example in section 3) although there are probably
counter examples.
7Most of literature on problems of juries adopt two state models in which µ = 'innocent' or µ = 'guilty'.
The model of continuous state admits the case where the jury also participates in the determination of
the appropriate punishment as the citizen judge system in Japan.
8In a basic New Keynesian model, nominal interest rate set in optimal discretionary policy is linear in
demand shock and cost shock. In this example, (innovations of) these shocks are the underlying states.
For detail, see the next section.
9This assumption on the prior about µ is intended for analytical ease. Although this is not so natural
according to the application given in the next section, no substantial di®erence arises from considering
proper prior. For a detail discussion, see the supplementary note.
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but does not know the realization of the others' private signals. The private signals
represent the members' individual views on the target which are generally distinct and
not communicated to the others.
Next, I set the payo® structure of the committee. Although the committee itself
is seated for making a decision near to the true µ under imperfect information, each
committee member pursues her own objectives. In this simple model, I assume that each
member j votes aj 2 R so as to maximize her own payo® function
uj = ¡(1¡ r)(aj ¡ µ)2 ¡ r(aj ¡ ¹a)2; (1)
where r 2 [0; 1) and ¹a = 1
N
PN
k=1 ak. The meaning of the payo® function above is as
follows. Each member j has two goals. One is to hit the true target and the other is not
to remove her vote from the average of all. That is, while she honestly tries to contribute
to an appropriate decision, she also seeks coordination with the other members even
though it makes the performance of the committee worse. Thus, I interpret parameter
r as the degree of coordination motive of the members. Note that I assume that the
objective of establishing the committee is to grasp the true target and make the decision
as correct as possible. 10 Since the coordination motive distorts the members' use of
information, it generates only a loss for the performance of the committee.
However, there are some reasons for considering such coordination motive. Usual
committees are established for better decision-making by choosing the delegations from
the large organizations. For example, ¯rms hold committee meetings to make decisions
on big bargains or selections of recruits, governments summon well-informed persons
committees for various policy issues and the central banks have the formal policy boards
for decision-making on monetary policy. In the cases of policy issues, since each member's
saying or voting in the meeting is often released to the public, she will be at least partially
motivated to coordinate with the other members. In the cases of the ¯rms, although the
records are rarely opened formally, what the members said in the meeting usually spreads
from nowhere or can be speculated by the outsiders. Therefore, I interpret r also as a
measure of the indirect e®ect of transparency on decision-making in the committee.
All the votes are aggregated by a speci¯c voting rule and it becomes the ¯nal decision
of the committee. For analytical ease, I assume that the voting rule of the benchmark
case is the arithmetic mean:
a^ =
1
N
NX
j=1
aj: (2)
10I set the performance measure of the committee along this line soon later.
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This rule is quite simple but enough for grasping the basic mechanism this paper suggests.
Of course, the approach I will take is applicable to the case of more realistic voting rule.
In section 2.4, I analyze the case of the median-voting rule:
a^ = med
1·j·N
fajg:
I will show that the basic properties of the model do not change in that case.
I ¯nally set a performance measure of the committee. Since in this paper I assume
that the committee is seated to make accurate decisions for the bene¯t of the organization
in the background, a natural measure of the committee's performance is
W = ¡(a^¡ µ)2: (3)
2.2 Equilibrium
I derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the model. The ¯rst order condition of each
member j's problem is
aj =
1¡ r
1¡ r
N
Ej(µ) +
(1¡ 1
N
)r
1¡ r
N
Ej(¹a);
where the symbol Ej represents a mathematical expectation conditioned on information
available to member j. Let ± =
(1¡ 1
N
)r
1¡ r
N
. Then, the FOC above is rewritten as
aj = (1¡ ±)Ej(µ) + ±Ej(¹a): (4)
Note that ± is increasing in N . That is, each member places a higher weight on the
average of all the votes relative to the target as the committee becomes larger. What
does cause it? Since the number of the committee members is ¯nite, each member can
partially control the average of all the votes: see (1). When the committee size is small,
she does not have to care about the others' behavior extremely because her power in the
committee is relatively large. As the committee becomes large, the power fades away and
she must seek harder for coordination with the other members. In short, the massiveness
of the group drives the individuals to bury themselves in it.
Equation (4) provides the conjecture that the equilibrium strategy is linear in common
and private signals. 11 In fact, the following proposition supports for it together with
the uniqueness property.
11For a heuristic derivation of equilibrium, put aj = (1 ¡ °)y + °xj . Here ° is an undetermined
coe±cient. Substituting this into (4) and comparing the coe±cients of both sides, the response coe±cient
° given in Proposition 1 is obtained.
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Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium strategy such that for all y; xj 2 R,
aj = (1¡ °)y + °xj;
where ° = (1¡r)¯
(1¡ r
N
)(®+¯)¡r(1¡ 1
N
)( ®
N
+¯)
.
Proof.
See Appendix A.
This equilibrium strategy brings the essential mechanism for the main result of the
present paper. The next assertion shows it.
Corollary 1 The response coe±cient ° to private signal is decreasing in N . Given ®, ¯
and r, it lies in the half-open interval
³
(1¡r)¯
®+(1¡r)¯ ;
¯
®+¯
i
.
Proof.
See Appendix B.
Corollary 1 asserts that each member's dependency of the common signal increases
as the size of the committee becomes larger. It results from the relationship between
each member's control of decision-making in the committee and coordination behavior
which I explained above. When the committee becomes larger, each member becomes
more sensitive to common signal to adjust her voting to the others' more precisely. If
the committee consists of only one person, the coordination motive vanishes and his
behavior accords with that of the basic statistical decision-making: °jN=1 = ¯®+¯ . As the
committee size goes to in¯nity, the response coe±cient ° converges to (1¡r)¯
®+(1¡r)¯ . That is,
the equilibrium strategy corresponds to that of the ¯nite-players version of Morris and
Shin's (2002) beauty contest game. In the ¯nite-players version of Morris and Shin's
(2002) beauty contest game, each player j has the same informational structure as the
model of the present paper and her utility function is 12
¡(1¡ r)(aj ¡ µ)2 ¡ r
³
aj ¡ 1
N ¡ 1
X
k 6=j
ak
´2
:
12As an alternative setting, we may assume that her utility function is
¡(1¡ r)(aj ¡ µ)2 ¡ r
N ¡ 1
X
k 6=j
(aj ¡ ak)2:
The solution under this utility function is the same as the case of the function in the text although the
social welfare function changes.
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The second objective of each player is the average of the others' actions, which does
not include her own action. In this case, each player can not control the average and
hence has to care about the others' behavior more greatly than the case where she can
do it. Therefore, the basic beauty contest game can be regarded as a limiting case of the
coordination game in this paper.
2.3 Optimal Size of the Committee
By (3) and Proposition 1, the decision of the committee is
a^ = (1¡ °)y + °
PN
k=1 xk
N
: (5)
Thus, substituting (5) into (3), the expected performance of the committee is
E(W jµ) = ¡E
·µ
(1¡ °)(µ + ´) + °
PN
k=1(µ + "k)
N
¡ µ
¶2¸
= ¡E
·µ
(1¡ °)´ + °
PN
k=1 "k
N
¶2¸
= ¡(1¡ °)2®¡1 ¡ °2¯
¡1
N
:
I investigate the relationship between the size of the committee and its performance.
Considering the continuation of E(W jµ) with respect to N , I obtain
@E(W jµ)
@N
= 2(1¡ °)®¡1 @°
@N
¡ 2°¯
¡1
N
¢ @°
@N
+ °2¯¡1N¡2: (6)
The meaning of (6) is clear in view of Corollary 1. Enlarging the committee has three
e®ects on its performance. Note that, since @°
@N
< 0 by Corollary 1, the ¯rst term is
negative and the second and third terms are positive. The ¯rst term represents the
indirect negative e®ect due to the stronger coordination behavior. The second term is
the indirect positive e®ect owing to the decrease of the members' dependency on the
noisy private signals. The third term is the direct positive e®ect from the decrease of the
volatility due to the noisy private signals by averaging larger samples.
The next proposition provides a necessary and su±cient condition for the existence
of the optimal committee size under the average-voting rule.
Proposition 2 Under the average-voting rule, there exists a ¯nite optimal size of the
committee if and only if the parameter set satis¯es r > 1
5
and ¯
®
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 .
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Proof.
See Appendix C.
The parameter condition above means that the degree of coordination motive, r, is
not so weak and the precision of common (private, resp.) information relative to private
(common) information is large (small).
This result is intuitively plausible. When the coordination motive is strong, each mem-
ber depends highly on common information to approximate her own voting to the others'.
Besides, when the relative precision of common information is larger, each member also
places a higher weight on common information to hit the true target more accurately. 13
The negative e®ect of enlarging the committee is ampli¯ed in such a case. Then, this
dominates the positive e®ects in the limit since the marginal contribution of averaging
reduces as the committee becomes larger.
In fact, the expected performance E(W jµ) is single-peaked in the committee size N
under the necessary and su±cient condition for the existence of the optimal size. 14
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 gives a numerical example of this relationship. 15 When the committee size is
small, the direct positive e®ect of averaging is very large and it (and the indirect positive
e®ect) dominates the negative e®ect. However, as the committee size becomes larger, the
direct positive e®ect becomes smaller and the negative e®ect becomes relatively larger.
Thus, the expected performance has the single peak in the committee size. According
to the discussion above, I obtain the following characterization of the optimal committee
size.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the parameter set satis¯es the necessary and su±cient condi-
tion for the existence of the optimal committee size under the average-voting rule: r > 1
5
and ¯
®
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 . Then, the optimal size N
¤ is given by the following equation.
N¤ = argmax
N2fN¡( ~N);N+( ~N)g
E(W jµ);
where ~N 2 R is the solution of the equation
°
1¡ ° ¢
1
N
¡ °
2
2(1¡ °)
³ @°
@N
N2
´¡1
=
¯
®
13This mechanism necessarily works since I assume r < 1.
14A formal proof of this fact is given in the necessity part of the proof of Proposition 2.
15To depict Figure 1, I set r = 0:4, ® = 1:25 and ¯ = 1.
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with respect to N 2 R, N¡( ~N) is the maximal integer which is not larger than ~N and
N+( ~N) is the minimal integer which is not smaller than ~N .
Proof.
It is obtained immediately from the proof of Proposition 2. See Appendix C.
Note that ~N depends only on r and the precision ratio ¯
®
because ° and @°
@N
does
so. 16 Since ~N is the single peak of the continuation of E(W jµ) with respect to N , N¤
is mainly determined by them. However, rigorously speaking, N¤ depends on not the
precision ratio but the pair (®; ¯) in general. This is because E(W jµ) can not be written
as the function of r and ¯
®
and it is impossible to decide which of N¡( ~N) and N+( ~N) the
optimal size N¤ is equal to only with the values of r and ¯
®
.
Next, I investigate two relationships between the parameters and the optimal size.
Although it is di±cult to obtain them in analytical ways due to discreteness of the
committee size, I can ¯nd the robust qualitative results below.
First, I ¯x ® = 1:25 and ¯ = 1 as in Figure 1 and calculate the optimal sizes for
various values of r in [0:3; 0:99]. 17
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 illustrates the result. The optimal committee size is non-increasing in the
degree of coordination motive, r. When r is small and hence the coordination motive
is weak, the negative e®ect of enlarging the committee is small. The importance of
enhancing the positive e®ect of information aggregation is then relatively large. There-
fore, the optimal size of the committee is very large for small r. As r becomes larger,
the optimal size decreases rapidly since the negative e®ect of coordination acceleratingly
swells. Figure 2 provides another interesting fact. It illustrates that the optimal size of
the committee is one for su±ciently large r. That is, if the coordination motive is very
strong and adding a committee member is too costly, then a single decision-maker can be
optimal to choose a correct alternative. When the members bury themselves and follow
the incorrect common sense with little criticism, appointing a sincere individual may be
a good measure to reach a right conclusion.
Second, I set r = 0:4 as in Figure 1 and calculate the optimal sizes for various values
of ® (¯, resp.) in [1; 5] with ¯ ¯xed to 2 (® ¯xed to 3).
[Figure 3 about here.]
16See the necessity part of the proof of Proposition 2.
17When ® = 1:25 and ¯ = 1, the existence condition is met for all 0:3 · r · 0:99.
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Figure 3 illustrates the result. Given the precision of private information (common
information, resp.), the optimal committee size is non-increasing (non-decreasing) in the
precision of common information (private information). Given the degree of coordination
motive, when the precision of common information is large relative to that of private
information, each member places a high weight on common information. Then, enlarging
the committee strongly foments the coordination behavior among the members. The op-
timal size is hence non-increasing in ®. Contrary, since such a negative e®ect of enlarging
the committee is small when the precision of private information is large, the gain of
information aggregation is relatively large. Thus, the optimal size is non-decreasing in
¯. The result above suggests that we should establish a small committee to reduce the
coordination loss when the common sense (or the sta® report) on the issue concerned is
precise to some extent.
2.4 Median-Voting Rule
In the last of this section, I consider the case where the voting rule is the median-voting
rule. The basic properties of the model do not change even under this voting rule. The
discussion below ensures the robustness of the results in section 2.3 in a wide class of
voting rules.
Since each committee member's behavior is invariant in voting rules, the decision of
the committee is
a^ = med
1·j·N
f(1¡ °)y + °xjg
= µ + (1¡ °)´ + ° med
1·j·N
f"jg:
Thus, the expected performance of the committee is
E(W jµ) = ¡(1¡ °)2®¡1 ¡ °2E
·³
med
1·j·N
f"jg
´2¸
:
The expectation in the second term of the right-hand side has no analytical expression for
¯nite N . However, since the distribution of med1·j·Nf"jg is approximately the normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance ¼¯
¡1
2N
for su±ciently large N (med1·j·Nf"jg /
N(0; ¼¯
¡1
2N
)), I obtain
E(W jµ) ¼ ¡(1¡ °)2®¡1 ¡ °2¼¯
¡1
2N
(7)
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for su±ciently large N . 18 Thus, I obtain a su±cient condition for the existence of the
¯nite optimal committee size under the median-voting rule by use of this asymptotic
property.
Corollary 3 Under the median-voting rule, there exists a ¯nite optimal size of the com-
mittee if the parameter set satis¯es r > ¼
¼+8
and ¯
®
< (¼+8)r¡¼
¼(1¡r)2 .
Proof.
See Appendix D.
The intuition for this su±cient condition is similar to Proposition 2 but there is a
quantitative di®erence between the median-voting rule and the average-voting rule. One
can show that the parameter region which satis¯es the su±cient condition under the
median-voting rule is smaller than that of the average-voting rule. Figure 4 illustrates it.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The cause of this result is the di®erence between statistical properties of mean and
median. That is, as seen in med1·j·Nf"jg / N(0; ¼¯¡12N ), sample median converges in
probability more slowly than sample mean. 19 Therefore, under the median-voting rule,
it is more important to promote the positive e®ect of information aggregation than under
the average-voting rule. This makes the existence condition under the median-voting rule
stricter.
A necessary condition along the line of Proposition 2 can not be obtained under the
median-voting rule because there is no analytical expression of the distribution of sample
median for small sample: see the necessity part of the proof of Proposition 2. However,
the basic properties under the average-voting rule will be robust since the distribution of
sample median approaches that of sample mean very quickly. 20 Moreover, the proofs of
Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 imply the following. In general, we can obtain a similar
(su±cient) condition for the existence of the optimal committee size when we adopt as
18It is known that when n random variables Xi (i = 1; :::; n) identically and independently follow a
distribution with median M and density function f , the distribution of Yn = med1·i·nfXig with large
sample is approximately the normal distribution with meanM and variance 14n(f(M))2 . As a special case,
when each Xi follow the normal distribution with mean ¹ and variance ¾2 identically and independently,
the distribution of the sample median Yn is approximatelyN(¹; ¼¾
2
2n ) for large n. For a detail explanation,
see Kenney and Keeping (1962).
19Since 1N
PN
j=1 "j » N(0; ¯
¡1
N ), the variance of sample mean is
¼
2 times as small as that of sample
median.
20For a detail explanation on this fact, see Maritz and Jarret (1978).
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a voting rule any statistics which has the consistency as an estimator of the true state
with respect to private signals and converges at an order not lower than sample mean. 21
3 Monetary Policy Committee
In this section, I provide a simple application of the model in Section 1. Following
Morimoto (2009) basically, I set up the model for monetary policy analysis which starts
from decision-making by the monetary policy committee. For a detail explanation of the
model setting, see Morimoto (2009).
3.1 Macroeconomic Model
As the underlying macroeconomic model, I adopt a basic New Keynesian model. The
model consists of the two stochastic di®erence equations
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ 1
¾
(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + ut; (8)
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ·xt + et; (9)
together with a monetary policy rule. Here, xt; ¼t; it; ut; et are output gap, in°ation rate,
nominal interest rate, demand shock and cost shock in period t respectively and ¯; ¾; · are
positive parameters. Parameters ¯; ¾; · represent the discount rate, constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution and impact of one unit output gap on in°ation, respectively.
I assume that ut and et follow AR(1) processes in such a way that
ut = ½uut¡1 + 't;
et = ½eet¡1 + Ãt;
where ½u; ½e 2 [0; 1) and the innovations 't and Ãt are normally distributed with mean
zero and variances ¾2' and ¾
2
Ã respectively. Once a setting rule of nominal interest rate
is speci¯ed, macro dynamics of the model economy is determined as sequences of output
gap and in°ation rate under the policy rule.
As in most works in optimal monetary policy, I adopt the following social loss function
as the welfare measure.
L ´ V (¼) + ¸V (x); (10)
21An estimator for a parameter is said to satisfy consistency if it converges in probability to the true
value of the parameter.
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where V (¼) and V (x) are asymptotic variances of in°ation rate and output gap and ¸ is
the weight that society places on output gap relative to in°ation. 22
3.2 Interest Rate Setting by Committee
Next, I set up the process of decision-making on interest rate setting in the monetary
policy committee. The committee consists of N (ex-ante) homogeneous members. The
informational structure of the committee is as follows. Each committee member faces
information imperfectness about innovations of demand shock and cost shock. For sim-
plicity, I assume that each committee member has improper °at prior about them over
the real line. 23 In the end of period t¡ 1, each member receives two kinds of signals on
innovations of demand shock and cost shock in period t. One is common signal and the
other is private signal. Each member j0s common signal is of the standard form such as
'ct = 't + ¹t;
Ãct = Ãt + ºt;
where the noise terms of ¹t and ºt are independently and normally distributed with mean
zero and variance ¾2¹ and ¾
2
º respectively. There are some sources of common signals
of the committee members. The committee members probably have a kind of well-
balanced recognition on economic states as macroeconomists. Besides, in most actual
central banks, the ¯rst step of or one of preparations for the meeting of monetary policy
committees is the sta® report on the present conditions and future developments of the
economies.
Each member j's private signal is of the standard form such as
'jt = 't + "
j
t ;
22In the usual analysis in the New Keynesian literature, the welfare measure is the second order
approximation of the household's utility function. In the basic model, it is proportional to
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
¡
¼2t + ¸x
2
t
¢
:
In this paper, however, I focus only on the average performance of monetary policy and reset it to
lim
¯!1
(1¡ ¯)E0
1X
t=0
¯t
¡
¼2t + ¸x
2
t
¢
= L:
23Although it is more natural to assume that each member knows the distribution of innovations,
't » N(0; ¾2') and Ãt » N(0; ¾2Ã), this does not change the basic properties below and only complicates
manipulations. For details, see the supplementary note.
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Ãjt = Ãt + ´
j
t ;
where the noise terms of "jt and ´
j
t are independently and normally distributed with mean
zero and variance ¾2" and ¾
2
´ respectively.
In the meeting of the monetary policy committee, based on her own information, each
member j votes the level of nominal interest rate in period t, ijt , to maximize her own
expected payo®. The function form of the payo® function is assumed to be
¡r(ijt ¡ i¤t )2 ¡ (1¡ r)(ijt ¡¹it)2; (11)
where r 2 [0; 1), ¹it = 1N
PN
j=1 i
j
t and i
¤
t is the nominal interest rate in period t set in
optimal discretionary policy under perfect information by a single policy maker. That is,
i¤t is the solution of the following linear-quadratic problem.
24
min ¼2t + ¸x
2
t ;
s:t: xt = Etxt+1 ¡ 1
¾
(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + ut;
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ·xt + et:
Solving this problem, I obtain the analytical expression of i¤t such that
i¤t = ¾ut + ©et;
where © = ¸
c½e+(1¡½e)¾·
¸c(1¡¯½e)+·2 .
Nominal interest rate in period t, it, is determined by aggregating the voting rates with
a speci¯c rule. As the benchmark case, I assume that the voting rule is the arithmetic
mean:
it =
1
N
NX
j=1
ijt : (12)
This is quite simple but su±cient for the purpose of this paper. In the actual institutions,
however, the majority rule is often adopted and hence it is natural to consider the case
of the median-voting rule:
it = med
1·j·N
fijtg: (13)
I will show that as in the simple model of the previous section, the basic result does not
change under the median-voting rule.
24For a detail explanation of this issue, see Walsh (2003).
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3.3 Equilibrium Dynamics and Macroeconomic Volatility
Now let us see the equilibrium strategy of the subgame in the committee. The ¯rst order
condition of member j's problem is
ijt = (1¡ ±)Ejt¡1(i¤t ) + ±Ejt¡1(¹it);
where Ejt¡1 is a mathematical expectation conditioned on information available to member
j in the end of period t¡ 1. Since
Ejt¡1(i
¤
t ) = ¾
·
½uut¡1 +
¾¡2¹
¾¡2" + ¾¡2¹
'ct +
¾¡2"
¾¡2" + ¾¡2¹
'jt
¸
+ ©
·
½eet¡1 +
¾¡2º
¾¡2´ + ¾¡2º
Ãct +
¾¡2´
¾¡2´ + ¾¡2º
Ãjt
¸
;
I obtain the following proposition immediately from Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique equilibrium strategy of the form such that
ijt = ¾[½uut¡1 + °u'
j
t + (1¡ °u)'ct ] + ©[½eet¡1 + °eÃjt + (1¡ °e)Ãct ]; (14)
where °u =
(1¡r)¾¡2"
(1¡ r
N
)(¾¡2¹ +¾¡2" )¡r(1¡ 1N )(
¾¡2¹
N
+¾¡2" )
and °e =
(1¡r)¾¡2´
(1¡ r
N
)(¾¡2º +¾¡2´ )¡r(1¡ 1N )(
¾¡2º
N
+¾¡2´ )
.
Substituting (14) into (12), I obtain the following equilibrium nominal interest rate.
it = ¾[ut + °u~"t + (1¡ °u)¹t] + ©[et + °e ~´t + (1¡ °e)ºt]
= i¤t + ¾[°u~"t + (1¡ °u)¹t] + ©[°e ~´t + (1¡ °e)ºt]; (15)
where ~"t =
1
N
PN
j=1 "
j
t and ~´t =
1
N
PN
j=1 ´
j
t . The second and third terms of (15) represent
the ine±ciency of interest rate setting due to imperfect information and coordination
behavior among the committee members.
Macro dynamics of the model economy is given by (8), (9) and (15). Note that since
the relevant state variables in period t are et; ~"t; ~´t; ¹t and ºt, equilibrium output gap
and in°ation rate is linear in them. Thus, by the method of undetermined coe±cients, I
obtain the following equilibrium output gap and in°ation rate. 25
xt = ¡ ·
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2 et ¡
·
°u~"t +
°e©
¾
~´t + (1¡ °u)¹t + (1¡ °e)©
¾
ºt
¸
; (16)
¼t =
¸c
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2 et ¡ ·
·
°u~"t +
°e©
¾
~´t + (1¡ °u)¹t + (1¡ °e)©
¾
ºt
¸
: (17)
25For the detail of the calculation, see Appendix E.
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The bracketed parts of the equilibrium output gap and in°ation rate are the ine±cient
economic °uctuations due to the ine±cient interest rate setting by the committee. Note
that the second term of (17) is · times as large as that of (16). This means that the
ine±cient interest rate setting brings the ine±cient output gap °uctuation, ¡[°u~"t +
°e©
¾
~´t + (1 ¡ °u)¹t + (1¡°e)©¾ ºt], and it hits on in°ation through the aggregate supply
relation, the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
To ¯nd equilibrium social loss, let us calculate the asymptotic variances of the output
gap and in°ation rate. After some calculations, I obtain
V (x) =
·
·
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
¸2 ¾2Ã
1¡ ½2e
+
1
N
·
°2u¾
2
" +
³°e©
¾
´2
¾2´
¸
+
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
; (18)
V (¼) =
·
¸c
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
¸2 ¾2Ã
1¡ ½2e
+
·2
N
·
°2u¾
2
" +
³°e©
¾
´2
¾2´
¸
+·2
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
: (19)
The ¯rst terms of (18) and (19) are due to cost shock, one of the economic fundamentals.
The second (third, resp.) terms are due to noisiness of private (common) information of
the committee members, which is one of the non-fundamentals. By (10), (18) and (19),
the social loss in equilibrium is
L =
·³ ¸c
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
´2
+ ¸
³ ·
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
´2¸ ¾2Ã
1¡ ½2e
+(·2 + ¸)
·
1
N
µ
°2u¾
2
" +
³°e©
¾
´2
¾2´
¶
+
µ
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¶¸
:
The social loss L seems somewhat complicated but its meaning is clear. The ¯rst term
is equal to the social loss under optimal discretionary policy under perfect information.
Since I adopt optimal policy under discretion as the optimality concept, it is not relevant
to the performance of the monetary policy committee. The second term is the social
loss generated by the ine±cient interest rate setting due to imperfect information and
coordination behavior among the members. Therefore, the second term of L should be
regarded as the performance measure of the monetary policy committee in this model.
Note that it corresponds just to E(W ) in the previous section.
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3.4 Optimal Size of MPC
In the rest of this section, I investigate an existence condition of the optimal size of the
monetary policy committee and its property. As mentioned above, the optimal size is
the size N 2 N which maximizes the performance measure of the committee:
P ´ ¡ 1
N
·
°2u¾
2
" +
³°e©
¾
´2
¾2´
¸
¡
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
:
Note that when the response coe±cients °u and °e are independent of the committee
size N , P is increasing in N and the ¯rst term of P converges to zero as N goes to
in¯nity. This is a variant of Condorcet's assertion. Although the ine±ciency of interest
rate setting does not disappear because of noisy common information, the idiosyncratic
noise of private information is perfectly absorbed by averaging the large sample in the
limit. 26
In general cases, °u and °e depend on N and hence P is not necessarily increasing
in N . So that, the optimal size of the monetary policy committee can exist. The next
proposition provides both of necessary and su±cient conditions separately.
Proposition 4 The following statements on the existence of the optimal size of the mon-
etary policy committee hold under the average-voting rule.
1. There exists a ¯nite optimal size of the monetary policy committee if the parameter
set satis¯es that r > 1
5
, ¾
¡2
"
¾¡2¹
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 and
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 .
2. There exists a ¯nite optimal size of the monetary policy committee only if the pa-
rameter set satis¯es that r > 1
5
and ¾
¡2
"
¾¡2¹
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 or
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 .
Proof.
See Appendix F.
Because this model includes two economic shocks, demand and cost shock, it is di±cult
to ¯nd exactly a necessary and su±cient condition along the line of Proposition 2. 27
However, the necessary condition above is close to the su±cient condition. This is because
the mechanism for the existence of the optimal size is similar to that of the simple model
in the previous section. Note that according to Figure 4, if r > 1
5
, the condition that ¾
¡2
"
¾¡2¹
<
5r¡1
(1¡r)2 and
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 is normally satis¯ed because common information is interpreted
as well-balanced recognition among the economist or the sta® report and hence it does
26See Corollary 1 and 7 of Morimoto (2009).
27See the proofs of Proposition 4 and Corollary 4.
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not seem far more imprecise than the members' private information. Therefore, it can
be said that the monetary policy committees should not be so large under central bank
transparency and a reputation e®ect if we consider a source of the coordination motive
as such.
The properties of the optimal size of the monetary policy committee are basically
similar to those of the simple model. So that, I do not report numerical examples here.
First, the optimal size N¤ is non-increasing in r. That is, the stronger what foments the
coordination behavior among the committee members is, the smaller the monetary pol-
icy committees should be. In the standpoint mentioned above, it is optimal to promote
e±cient use of the members' information by holding the monetary policy committees
to small groups when central bank transparency and a reputation e®ect is large. Sec-
ond, given the precision of private information, the optimal size is non-increasing in the
precision of common information. In the context of the monetary policy committee, it
suggests that the committee size should be small when the sta® report or common un-
derstanding of general economists on the present and future economic states is reliable
to some extent.
Next, I provide a su±cient condition for the existence of the optimal size of the
monetary policy committee under the median-voting rule, which is similar to the case of
the average-voting rule as in the simple model.
Corollary 4 If the parameter set satis¯es that r > ¼
¼+8
, ¾
¡2
"
¾¡2¹
< (¼+8)r¡¼
¼(1¡r)2 and
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
<
(¼+8)r¡¼
¼(1¡r)2 , then there exists a ¯nite optimal size of the monetary policy committee.
Proof.
See Appendix G.
As in the simple model in the previous section, the parameter condition for the ex-
istence of the optimal committee size under the median voting rule is stricter than that
of the average-voting rule. It suggests that the the e®ect of information aggregation is
more valuable for the monetary policy committees which adopt the majority rule.
3.5 A Positive Implication
Finally, I provide a positive implication of the model for the actual monetary policy
committees. Using a data set on the characteristics of the monetary policy committees
in more than 30 countries from 1960 through 2000, Berger and Nitsch (2008) report that
in°ation volatility is U-shaped in the size of the monetary policy committee. In the
present paper, the in°ation volatility exhibits a similar behavior as in the case of the
20
simple model since the the part of variace of in°ation which depends on the committee
size is
·2
N
·
°2u¾
2
" +
³°e©
¾
´2
¾2´
¸
+ ·2
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
:
Since Berger and Nitsch (2008) also report that similar results are obtained about output
growth, one of the real terms, I conjecture that the property results from a feature of the
functions of committee decision-making for economic stabilization. The present paper
gives an explanation for the property in terms of the positive e®ect of information aggre-
tion and the negative e®ect of fomenting the ine±cient coordination which an increase
of the committee size brings to the performance of the monetary policy committee.
4 Conclusion
How many members should the committees consist of? The present paper provides an
answer for this question in committee design, focusing on coordination behavior among
the members based on higher order beliefs. The approach in this paper is an alternative
to incorporating information acquisition costs into the payo® structures, which is usually
adopted in literature. This paper also analyzes in a formal model the optimal size of
monetary policy committees, which is one of the most important issues of monetary
policy design.
There are a few remaining problems. The ¯rst one is to construct a theoretical
foundation for the members' coordination motive. It seems very signi¯cant in the area of
committee design. Especially, I think transparency and reputation can play an important
role for it. The second one is to ¯nd applications of the mechanism given in this paper to
other economic problems. Considering the structure of this paper's model, the mechanism
will be applicable to the models in which the optimal action of the committee under
perfect information is a linear function of states. I believe that such situations are not
rare in the economic phenomena of our interest.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
By the iterated substituion of F.O.C. (4), I obtain 28
aj = (1¡ ±)Ej(µ) + (1¡ ±)±Ej( ¹E(µ)) + (1¡ ±)±2Ej( ¹E2(µ)) + ¢ ¢ ¢
= (1¡ ±)
1X
s=0
±sEj( ¹E
s(µ)): (20)
To calculate this in¯nite series, I use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For all j and s,
Ej( ¹E
s(µ)) = (1¡ ¹s)y + ¹sxj; (21)
where ¹s =
¯( ®
N
+¯)s
(®+¯)s+1
.
Proof of Lemma 1.
I prove it by induction. Choose arbitrary member j. The assertion obviously holds
when s = 0. Suppose that it holds for an arbitrary s. Then, by (21), I obtain
¹Es+1(µ) =
1
N
NX
k=1
Ek( ¹E
s(µ))
= (1¡ ¹s)y + ¹s
PN
k=1 xk
N
:
Therefore,
Ej( ¹E
s+1(µ)) = (1¡ ¹s)y + ¹sEj
³PN
k=1 xk
N
´
= (1¡ ¹s)y + ¹s
³ 1
N
xj +
N ¡ 1
N
¢ ®y + ¯xj
®+ ¯
´
=
·
1¡
³
1¡ N ¡ 1
N
¢ ®
®+ ¯
´
¹s
¸
y + ¹s
³ 1
N
+
N ¡ 1
N
¢ ¯
®+ ¯
´
xj:
By 1¡ N¡1
N
¢ ®
®+¯
= 1
N
+ N¡1
N
¢ ¯
®+¯
=
®
N
+¯
®+¯
, I obtain
Ej( ¹E
s+1(µ)) =
³
1¡
®
N
+ ¯
®+ ¯
¹s
´
y + ¹s
®
N
+ ¯
®+ ¯
xj
= (1¡ ¹s+1)y + ¹s+1xj:
28The symbol ¹Es(µ) denotes an s-th order average expectation. That is, for an arbitrary s 2 f1; 2; :::g,
¹Es(µ) = 1N
PN
k=1Ek
¡ ¹Es¡1(µ)¢.
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This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Substituting (21) into (20), I obtain
aj = (1¡ ±)
1X
s=0
±s
h
(1¡ ¹s)y + ¹sxj
i
=
·
1¡ (1¡ ±)
1X
s=0
±s¹s
¸
y + (1¡ ±)
µ 1X
s=0
±s¹s
¶
xj:
After some algebraic manipulations, I obtain 29
(1¡ ±)
1X
s=0
±s¹s = °;
where ° is de¯ned in Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Proof of Corollary 1
The denominator of ° can be reduced to
(1¡ r)®+
·
1¡ r
³ 2
N
¡ 1
N2
´¸
¯:
Considering its continuation with respect to N , I obtain
@
@N
³ 2
N
¡ 1
N2
´
= ¡2N¡3(N ¡ 1) · 0:
This shows that the denominator of ° is increasing in N and positive. 30 Therefore, ° is
decreasing in N .
It is immediately obtained that ° = ¯
®+¯
when N = 1 and limN!1 ° =
(1¡r)¯
®+(1¡r)¯ .
Q.E.D.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
(Su±ciency)
Since E(W jµ) converges as N goes to in¯nity, a ¯nite optimal size of the committee
exists if @E(W )
@N
< 0 for su±ciently large N . I derive an explicit expression of this su±cient
condition.
29Note that the in¯nite series
P1
s=0 ±
s¹s converges since
P1
s=0 ±
s¹s = ¯®+¯
P1
s=0
µ
(1¡ 1N )r
1¡ rN ¢(
®
N +¯)
¶s
.
30It is larger than or equal to (1¡ r)(®+ ¯) > 0.
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Equation (6) can be reduced to
@E(W jµ)
@N
= 2(1¡ °)¯¡1 @°
@N
·
¯
®
¡
µ
°
1¡ ° ¢
1
N
¡ °
2
2(1¡ °)
³ @°
@N
N2
´¡1¶¸
: (22)
Note that @°
@N
< 0 for all N by Corollary 1 and that the second term of the bracketed
part of (22) converges to zero as N goes in¯nity. Thus, if
¯
®
> ¡ lim
N!1
°2
2(1¡ °)
³ @°
@N
N2
´¡1
; (23)
then @E(W jµ)
@N
< 0 for su±ciently large N , which ensures the existence of a ¯nite optimal
size of the committee.
Let us ¯nd the parameter condition equivalent to (23). After some calculations, I
obtain
lim
N!1
@°
@N
N2 = ¡ 2r(1¡ r)®¯
[®+ (1¡ r)¯]2 :
By limN!1 ° =
(1¡r)¯
®+(1¡r)¯ , I obtain
lim
N!1
°2
2(1¡ °)
³ @°
@N
N2
´¡1
= ¡¯
®
¢ 1¡ r
4r
¢
h
1 + (1¡ r)¯
®
i
:
Thus, (23) if and only if
1 >
1¡ r
4r
¢
h
1 + (1¡ r)¯
®
i
; (24)
which is equivalent to that r > 1
5
and ¯
®
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 .
(Necessity)
I will show that E(W jµ) is monotonically increasing in N unless the parameter set
satis¯es that r > 1
5
and ¯
®
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 . De¯ne the function f : (1;1)! R by
f(N) =
°
1¡ ° ¢
1
N
¡ °
2
2(1¡ °)
³ @°
@N
N2
´¡1
; for all N 2 (1;1):
Note that f(N) is the second term of the bracketed part of (22). Since ° is decreasing in
N by Corollary 1, the ¯rst term of f(N) is decreasing in N . Since
@°
@N
N2 = ¡ 2r(1¡ r)(1¡
1
N
)®¯h
(1¡ r
N
)(®+ ¯)¡ r(1¡ 1
N
)( ®
N
+ ¯)
i2 ;
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by use of the de¯nition of °, I obtain
¡ °
2
2(1¡ °)
³ @°
@N
N2
´¡1
=
(1¡ r)2¯2
1¡ ° ¢
1
2r(1¡ r)(1¡ 1
N
)®¯
:
Since ° is decreasing in N by Corollary 1, the denominator of the right-hand side above
is increasing in N . This implies that the second term of f(N) is also decreasing in N .
Therefore, f is a decreasing function.
Note that limN!1
@E(W )
@N
> 0 by limN!1 f(N) = +1. Thus, since f is monotonically
decreasing, @E(W )
@N
> 0 for all N unless
¯
®
> lim
N!1
f(N):
Immediately from the calculation in the necessity part, this condition is equivalent to
that r > 1
5
and ¯
®
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 . Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Proof of Corollary 3
Since equation (7) holds for su±ciently large N , according to the proof of Proposition 2,
the next inequality is a su±cient condition for the existence of a ¯nite optimal size.
¯
®
>
¼
2
lim
N!1
°2
2(1¡ °)
³ @°
@N
N2
´¡1
: (25)
Hence, similar to (24), inequality (25) is equivalent to
1 >
¼
2
¢ 1¡ r
4r
h
1 + (1¡ r)¯
®
i
; (26)
which is equivalent to that r > ¼
¼+8
and ¯
®
< (¼+8)r¡¼
¼(1¡r)2 . Q.E.D.
Appendix E: Derivation of (16), (17), (18) and (19)
Macroeconomic dynamics of the arti¯cial economy is given by the following system of
stochastic di®erence equations.
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ 1
¾
(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + ut; (27)
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ·xt + et; (28)
it = ¾[ut + °u~"t + (1¡ °u)¹t] + ©[et + °e ~´t + (1¡ °e)ºt]: (29)
25
Since the relevant state variables in period t are et; ~"t; ~´t; ¹t and ºt, the solution will be
of the form
xt = Axet +Bx~"t + Cx ~´t +Dx¹t + Exºt; (30)
¼t = A¼et +B¼~"t + C¼ ~´t +D¼¹t + E¼ºt; (31)
where Ak; Bk; Ck; Dk and Ek (k = x; ¼) are undetermined coe±cients. Substituting
(30),(31) into (27),(29) and then (29) into (27) and comparing the coe±cients of both
sides, I obtain
Ax = ½eAx ¡ ©¡ ½eA¼
¾
; Bx = ¡°u; Cx = ¡°e©
¾
; (32)
Dx = ¡(1¡ °u); Ex = ¡(1¡ °e)©
¾
:
Substituting (30),(31) into (28) and comparing the coe±cients of both sides,
A¼ = ¯½eA¼ + ·Ax + 1; B¼ = ·Bx; C¼ = ·Cx; D¼ = ·Dx; E¼ = ·Ex: (33)
Solving the ¯rst equations of (32) and (33), Ax and A¼ turn out to be
Ax = ¡ ·
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2 ; A¼ =
¸c
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2 :
Thus, I obtain equilibrium output gap and in°ation rate in period t in the text.
Finally, I calculate asymptotic variances of output gap and in°ation rate. By et =
½eet¡1 + Ãt, asymptotic variance of et is
¾2Ã
1¡½2e . Besides, since et; "
j
t ; ´
j
t ; ¹t and ºt are
mutually independent, each covariance of them is zero. Noting the two facts above, I
¯nd asymptotic variance of output gap in the text. Similarly, I can calculate asymptotic
variance of in°ation rate in the text.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 4
(1. The Su±cient Condition)
I prove it in the same way as the proof of Proposition 3. By the de¯nition of the
performance measure of the monetary policy committee, the counterpart to (22) is
@P
@N
= 2
½
(1¡ °u)¾2"
@°u
@N
·
¾¡2"
¾¡2¹
¡ °u
1¡ °u ¢
1
N
+
°2u
2(1¡ °u)
³@°u
@N
N2
´¡1¸
+(1¡ °e)¾2´
@°e
@N
³©
¾
´2·¾¡2´
¾¡2º
¡ °e
1¡ °e ¢
1
N
+
°2e
2(1¡ °e)
³@°e
@N
N2
´¡1¸¾
: (34)
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Hence, a su±cient condition for that @L
@N
> 0 for su±ciently large N is
¾¡2"
¾¡2¹
> lim
N!1
°2u
2(1¡ °u)
³@°u
@N
N2
´¡1
and
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
> lim
N!1
°2e
2(1¡ °e)
³@°e
@N
N2
´¡1
:
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, this is equivalent to that r > 1
5
, ¾
¡2
"
¾¡2¹
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 and
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 .
(2. The Necessary Condition)
According to the proof of Proposition 2, if both of the ¯rst and the second terms of
(35) converge to some non-negative numbers, then the optimal size does not exists. Thus,
for the existence of the optimal size, it is necessary for at least one of them to converge to
a negative number. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, this is equivalent to r > 1
5
and
¾¡2"
¾¡2¹
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 or r >
1
5
and
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 , which can be reduced to r >
1
5
and ¾
¡2
"
¾¡2¹
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2
or
¾¡2´
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 . Q.E.D.
Appendix G: Proof of Corollary 4
Note that med1·j·Nf'jtg = 't+med1·j·Nf"jtg and med1·j·NfÃjtg = Ãt+med1·j·Nf´jtg.
Thus, by (13) and (14), nominal interest rate under median-voting rule is
it = i
¤
t + zt + ¾(1¡ °u)¹t + ©(1¡ °e)ºt;
where zt = med1·j·N f¾°u"jt + ©°e´jtg.
By the same way as in Appendix E, I obtain the following equilibrium output gap
and in°ation rate.
xt = ¡ ·
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2 et ¡
·
1
¾
zt + (1¡ °u)¹t + (1¡ °e)©
¾
ºt
¸
;
¼t =
¸c
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2 et ¡ ·
·
1
¾
zt + (1¡ °u)¹t + (1¡ °e)©
¾
ºt
¸
:
The asymptotic variances of the equilibrium output gap and in°ation rate are
V (x) =
·
·
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
¸2 ¾2Ã
1¡ ½2e
+
1
¾2
V (zt) +
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
;
V (¼) =
·
¸c
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
¸2 ¾2Ã
1¡ ½2e
+
·2
¾2
V (zt) + ·
2
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
;
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which give the social loss in equilibrium by (11). Since
zt / N
µ
0;
¼(¾2°2u¾
2
" + ©
2°2e¾
2
´)
2N
¶
;
I obtain that
V (x) ¼
·
·
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
¸2 ¾2Ã
1¡ ½2e
+
¼
2
¢ 1
N
·
°2u¾
2
" +
³°e©
¾
´2
¾2´
¸
+
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
;
V (¼) ¼
·
¸c
¸c(1¡ ¯½e) + ·2
¸2 ¾2Ã
1¡ ½2e
+
¼
2
¢ ·
2
N
·
°2u¾
2
" +
³°e©
¾
´2
¾2´
¸
+·2
·
(1¡ °u)2¾2¹ +
µ
(1¡ °e)©
¾
¶2
¾2º
¸
for su±ciently large N .
Therefore, according to the proof of Corollary 2 and Proposition 4, I obtain the result
of Corollary 4. 31 Q.E.D.
31See Appendix D and F.
28
References
Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks (1996), "Information aggregation, rationality, and the
Condorcet jury theorem", American Political Science Review, 90, 34-45.
Berger, H. and V. Nitsch (2008), "Too many cooks? Committees in monetary policy",
mimeo.
Blinder, A. (2007), "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?", European Journal
of Political Economy, 23, 106-123.
Condorcet, M. (1785), "Essai sur l'application de l'analyse ¶a la probabilit¶e des decisions
rendues a al pluralit¶e de voix", Paris: L'Imprimerie Royale.
Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1998), "Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of
unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting", American Political Science Review,
92, 23-35.
Gerling, K., GrÄuner, H.P., Kiel, A. and E. Schulte (2005), "Information acquisition and
decision making in committees: A survey", European Journal of Polical Economy, 21,
563-597.
Kenney, J.F., and E.S. Keeping (1962), "Mathematics of statistics", Part 2, Van Nos-
trand, Princeton.
Koriyama, Y. and B. Szentes (2009), "A resurrection of the Condorcet jury theorem",
Theoretical Economics, 4, 227-252.
Li, H. (2001), "A theory of conservatism", Journal of Political Economy, 109, 617-636.
Maritz, J.S., and R.G. Jarrett (1978), "A note on estimating the variance of the sample
median", Journal of the American Statistical Association, 73, 194-196.
Martinelli, C. (2006), "Would rational voters acquire costly information?", Journal of
Economic Theory, 129, 225-251.
Morimoto, K. (2009), "Optimal structure of monetary policy committees", mimeo.
Morris, S. and H.S. Shin (2002), "Social value of public information", American Eco-
nomic Review, 92, 1521-1534.
Mukhopadhaya, K. (2003), "Jury size and the free rider problem", Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics, and Organization, 19, 24-44.
29
Muto, T. (2007), "How do central banks make decisions?: Monetary policy by
committee", Summary of a speech at the Spring Meeting of the Japan
Society of Monetary Economics in Chiba on May 12, 2007, readable at
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/press/koen07/ko0709b.htm.
Sibert, A. (2006), "Central banking by committee", International Finance, 9, 145-168.
Walsh, C.E. (2003), "Monetary theory and policy", 2nd ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
30
A Supplementary Note for "Coordination Behavior
and Optimal Committee Size"¤
Keiichi Morimotoyz
January 27, 2010
Abstract
This is a supplementary note for Morimoto (2010) "Coordination Behavior and
Optimal Committee Size". Here, I treats the case where each committee member
has proper prior on underlying state µ.
Keywords: beauty contest, proper prior, Condorcet jury theorem
JEL Classi¯cation: D71; D84; E58
1 Incorporating Proper Prior into the Simple Model
Along the line of Morris and Shin (2002), Morimoto (2010) assumes each member's im-
proper °at prior about the underlying state over the real line. However, it is more natural
to adopt some informative prior about the underlying state according to applications to
committees of experts. I analyze such a case here and show that the results of Morimoto
(2010) do not change. For a detail of the notations and model setting, see Morimoto
(2010).
Suppose that the underlying state µ is normally distributed with mean zero and
variance !¡1 > 0 and each committee member knows this.
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1.1 A Derivation of the Unique Equilibrium Strategy
Recall that the ¯rst order condition for each member problem is
aj = (1¡ ±)Ej(µ) + ±Ej(¹a): (1)
First, I ¯nd the equilibrium strategy by a heuristic method. Since each member's es-
timation of the underlying state is partially anchored by the prior µ » N(0; !¡1), it
becomes
Ej(µ) =
! £ 0 + ®y + ¯xj
! + ®+ ¯
=
®
! + ®+ ¯
y +
¯
! + ®+ ¯
xj: (2)
Note that ®
!+®+¯
+ ¯
!+®+¯
< 1. Thus, I can conjecture that the equilibrium strategy is of
the form such that
aj = °cy + °pxj; (3)
where °c and °p are undetermined coe±cients such that °c + °p < 1. Substituting (2)
and (3) into (1), after some calculations, the left-hand size of (1) turns out to be·
(1¡ ±)¯
! + ®+ ¯
+ ±°c + ±
¯
! + ®+ ¯
³
1¡ 1
N
´
°p
¸
y
+
·
(1¡ ±)®
! + ®+ ¯
+
±
N
°p + ±
®
! + ®+ ¯
³
1¡ 1
N
´
°p
¸
xj:
Thus, comparing the coe±cients of both the sides of (1) and using the de¯nition of ±, I
obtain
°c =
(1¡ 2rN¡1 + rN¡2)®³
1¡ r
N
´
[¯ + ! + ®]¡ r
³
1¡ 1
N
´h
¯ + !+®
N
i ; (4)
°p =
(1¡ r)¯³
1¡ r
N
´
[¯ + ! + ®]¡ r
³
1¡ 1
N
´h
¯ + !+®
N
i : (5)
Second, I formally show that the strategy above is the unique equilibrium strategy.
Substituting (1) recursively, I obtain
aj = (1¡ ±)
1X
s=0
±sEj( ¹E
s(µ)): (6)
Thus, I next calculate the s-th order belief Ej( ¹E
s(µ)). For given s = 0; 1; :::, put the s-th
order belief of arbitrary member j as follows.
Ej( ¹E
s(µ)) = ¹sy + ºsxj: (7)
2
Then, since ¹Es+1(µ) = ¹sy + ºs
1
N
PN
k=1 xk, I obtain
Ej( ¹E
s+1(µ)) = ¹sy + ºs
³ 1
N
xj +
N ¡ 1
N
¢ ®y + ¯xj
! + ®+ ¯
´
=
·
¹s +
®
! + ®+ ¯
³
1¡ 1
N
´
ºs
¸
y +
!+®
N
¯
! + ®+ ¯
ºsxj:
Therefore, the coe±cients of higher order beliefs satisfy the simultaneous di®erence equa-
tion
¹s+1 = ¹s +
®
! + ®+ ¯
³
1¡ 1
N
´
ºs;
ºs+1 =
!+®
N
¯
! + ®+ ¯
ºs;
with the initial value (¹0; º0) = (
®
!+®+¯
; ¯
!+®+¯
). The solution of this equation is
¹s =
®
! + ®+ ¯
·
1 +
³
1¡ 1
N
´ ¯
! + ®+ ¯
¢ 1¡ ¿
s
1¡ ¿
¸
; for s = 0; 1; :::; (8)
¹s =
¯
! + ®+ ¯
¿ s; for s = 0; 1; :::; (9)
where ¿ =
!+®
N
+¯
!+®+¯
. Substituting (7), (8) and (9) into (6) and using the de¯nition of ±, I
obtain the unique equilibrium strategy of the form given by (3), (4) and (5).
I ¯nally check that the relationship between the committee size and the equilibrium
strategy.
@°c
@N
=
2r(1¡ r)N¡2(1¡N¡1)®¯h
(1¡ 2rN¡1 ¡N¡2)(! + ®) + (1¡ r)¯
i2 > 0; (10)
@°p
@N
= ¡ 2r(1¡ r)N
¡2(1¡N¡1)(! + ®)¯h
(1¡ 2rN¡1 ¡N¡2)(! + ®) + (1¡ r)¯
i2 < 0: (11)
lim
N!1
°c =
®
! + ®+ (1¡ r)¯ ; °cjN=1 =
®
! + ®+ ¯
; (12)
lim
N!1
°p =
(1¡ r)¯
! + ®+ (1¡ r)¯ ; °pjN=1 =
¯
! + ®+ ¯
(13)
1.2 Proper Prior and the Existence of Optimal Size
Next, I investigate the existence condition for the optimal size of the committee. Since
the distribution of µ is given in this case, it is natural to consider the unconditional
3
performance of the committee:
E(W ) = ¡E
·³
°c(µ + ´) + °p
1
N
NX
k=1
(µ + "k)¡ µ
´2¸
= ¡E
·³
°c´ + °p
1
N
NX
k=1
"k ¡ (1¡ (°c + °p))µ
´2¸
= ¡°2c®¡1 ¡ °2p
¯¡1
N
¡ [1¡ (°c + °p)]2!¡1: (14)
The third term of (14) is generated by the weak response to common and private signals
due to the prior of mean zero. Di®erentiating E(W ) with respect to N , I obtain
@E(W )
@N
= ¡2°c®¡1 @°c
@N
¡ 2°p¯
¡1
N
¢ @°p
@N
+ °2p¯
¡1N¡2 + 2[1¡ (°c + °p)]!¡1@(°c + °p)
@N
:
The ¯rst, second and third terms are the same e®ects as those of the benchmark model.
The forth term is the negative e®ect from that each member is more strongly anchored
by the prior of mean zero. 1 Since
@E(W )
@N
= 2°c¯
¡1@°p
@N
·
¡ ¯
®
¢ @°c=@N
@°p=@N
¡
µ
°p
°c
¢ 1
N
¡ °
2
p
2°c
³@°p
@N
N2
´¡1
¡[1¡ (°c + °p)] 1
°c
¢ ¯
!
¢ @(°c + °p)=@N
@°p=@N
¶¸
;
along the line of the proof of Proposition 2, the following inequality is a su±cient condition
for the existence of the optimal committee size. 2
lim
N!1
½
¡ ¯
®
¢ @°c=@N
@°p=@N
¾
> lim
N!1
½
¡ °
2
p
2°c
³@°p
@N
N2
´¡1
+ [1¡ (°c + °p)] 1
°c
¢ ¯
!
¢ @(°c + °p)=@N
@°p=@N
¾
:
By (10), (11), (12) and (13), this is equivalent to
¯ + (1¡ r)¡1!
®
<
5r ¡ 1
(1¡ r)2 : (15)
1.3 The Case of Median-voting Rule
Incorporating the proper prior, the su±cient condition for the existence of the optimal
size under median-voting rule in Corollary 3 should be modi¯ed in the same way. Similar
1By (10) and (11), I obtain @(°c+°p)@N = ¡ 2r(1¡r)N
¡2(1¡N¡1)!¯£¡
1¡2rN¡1¡N¡2
¢
(!+®)+(1¡r)¯
¤2 < 0.
2Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, it can be easily checked that this is also a necessary condition.
4
to section 2.4 in the main text, since
E(W ) ¼ ¡°2c®¡1 ¡
¼
2
°2p
¯¡1
N
¡ [1¡ (°c + °p)]2!¡1
for su±ciently large N under the median-voting rule, a su±cient condition for the exis-
tence of the optimal size is
lim
N!1
½
¡ ¯
®
¢ @°c=@N
@°p=@N
¾
> lim
N!1
½
¡ ¼
2
¢ °
2
p
2°c
³@°p
@N
N2
´¡1
+ [1¡ (°c + °p)] 1
°c
¢ ¯
!
¢ @(°c + °p)=@N
@°p=@N
¾
:
This is equivalent to
¯ + (1¡ r)¡1!
®
<
(¼ + 8)r ¡ ¼
¼(1¡ r)2 : (16)
2 The Model of Monetary Policy Committee
Next, I modify the model of monetary policy committee in section 3 of the main text
along the line of the modi¯cation of the simple model. In this model, each member of
the monetary policy committee has prior such that 't » N(0; ¾2') and Ãt » N(0; ¾2Ã).
2.1 The Case of Average-voting Rule
Similar to section 1.2, the su±cient condition and necessary condition for the existence
of the optimal size in Proposition 4 are modi¯ed to 'r > 1
5
,
¾¡2" +(1¡r)¡1¾¡2'
¾¡2¹
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 and
¾¡2´ +(1¡r)¡1¾¡2Ã
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 ' and 'r >
1
5
and
¾¡2" +(1¡r)¡1¾¡2'
¾¡2¹
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 or
¾¡2´ +(1¡r)¡1¾¡2Ã
¾¡2º
< 5r¡1
(1¡r)2 '
respectively.
2.2 The Case of Median-voting Rule
Similar to section 1.3, the su±cient condition for the existence of the optimal size in
Corollary 4 is modi¯ed to 'r > ¼
¼+8
,
¾¡2" +(1¡r)¡1¾¡2'
¾¡2¹
< (¼+8)r¡¼
¼(1¡r)2 and
¾¡2´ +(1¡r)¡1¾¡2Ã
¾¡2º
<
(¼+8)r¡¼
¼(1¡r)2 '.
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Figure 1: The relationship between committee size and expected performance in the
simple model
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Figure 2: The relationship between degree of coordination motive and optimal size in the
simple model
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Figure 3: The relationship between precisons of common and private signals and optimal
size in the simple model
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Figure 4: The regions below the dashed and solid curves are the parameter regions which
satisfy the sufficient conditions for the exsistence of optimal committee size in the simple
model under the average and median voting rules respectively. The former contains the
latter.
